Thomson Defense of Abortion free essay sample

In this paper I will discuss the relevance of J. J. Thomson’s argument in her article, A Defense of Abortion, to that of pregnancy reduction and if there is any relevance, if there are exceptions or situations where that might change. J. J. Thomson’s argument in A Defense of Abortion is that the one thing a person has rights to is his/her body and the right to control what happens with it. Thomson also states that there is an innate desire and need for self-preservation that we all have that must additionally be considered. To support her argument, Thomson uses the example of a violinist where an unconscious violinist would only stay alive if you were constantly attached to him to compensate for his fatal kidney ailment. She states, â€Å"If he is unplugged from you now, he will die: but in nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you†. We will write a custom essay sample on Thomson Defense of Abortion or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page Her premise is that a person’s right to life does not include the right to use another person’s body and so by unplugging the violinist you do not violate his right to life or deprive him of the use of your body – to which he has no right. Another example Thomson uses to make her argument is that opponents use that abortion is â€Å"directly killing a child† therefore killing an innocent person is morally wrong however, â€Å"letting a person die† as in the case of the mother’s life being at risk would not be directly killing them. Thomson supports that this does not give the mother’s life the same status as the unborn child’s life and ignores her natural tendency for self-preservation. In the article The Two Minus One Pregnancy, pregnancy reduction is explained as having a multiple child pregnancy reduced at least one child, meaning they actually decide to kill one of the babies while still in the mothers stomach, whether that be for health or other reasons. J. J. Thompson’s arguments can all be applied to the discussion of pregnancy reduction since they could all be from the same situations as a single pregnancy. Whether the pregnancy was by choice or not the argument of Thompson’s that an individual has sole rights to their body and no person or group should assert that they have more right over another person than that person has over their self. In pregnancy reduction the same arguments that Thomson uses would apply especially concerning her example of finding yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child in it and that you would be crushed to death but the child would not be crushed to death if allowed to continue growing. She concludes that it would not be a bystander’s decision to decide who lives or dies but that you have the right to attack to save your own life. This is pertinent because pregnancy reduction requires a medical procedure, therefore involves a third party, a bystander, that you are asking to help you in your own self defense and because multiple pregnancy is most often a higher risk to the mother as well as the child. She states that both parties are innocent here and â€Å"the person threatened† can interfere even if it requires a third party to assist her. What a third party might do in response to a woman’s request for an abortion could vary and they have that right however no third party should stop a woman from defending â€Å"her life against the threat to it posed by the unborn child even if doing so involves its death. Thomson goes on to say that the mother has more rights than the child because the â€Å"mother owns the house† and therefore more rights than a renter. One difference that would be the most obvious is that it seems highly unlikely that a person would seek an abortion if they went through the time and expense of attempting to become pregnant by means of artificial insemination or other means of medically intentionally becoming pregnant. Even with this significant difference, it could be argued that a person might desire to not have more than one child at a time even though they â€Å"intentionally† got pregnant. Therefore, Thompson’s arguments still apply in these cases. There is no difference morally on abortion of a singleton pregnancy or a multiple pregnancy that would apply with Thomson’s arguments because those that supported the belief that any abortion was killing would use the same argument for â€Å"killing† one fetus and keeping one. Additionally, those that supported the woman’s right to make decisions about her own body or health would still use those claims in a woman’s right to choose whether or not she had the right to a pregnancy reduction. In conclusion, Thomson’s argument, in A Defense of Abortion, that the one thing a person has rights to is his or her body and the right to control what happens with it and to fight for self-preservation would not change at all if those same arguments were applied to a pregnancy reduction situation.

Choose two authors writing about either Market forecasting; Competitor analysis or Environmental analysis The WritePass Journal

Choose two authors writing about either Market forecasting; Competitor analysis or Environmental analysis INTRODUCTION Choose two authors writing about either Market forecasting; Competitor analysis or Environmental analysis , 93) The market interaction of a foothold as a new means of doing business or to interact with the consumer base is a response to the competitor analysis of competitive benchmarking.   The competitor rivalry between firms in the market place is purported by Upson et al to be driven by the use of footholds to enter and leave new markets.   â€Å"Foothold moves (attacks and withdrawals) can-have important implications for the nature of rivalry between firms.†Ã‚   (Upson et al, 2012, 93)   The use of foothold moves may   determine competitor reaction when willfully responding to a foothold strategy.   The foothold allows for a reactant, which is a market competitor to create a strategy in response to a market move from a much larger market competitor operating in a parallel market likely in the same industry. The aforementioned analysis is supported by the following past research provided by Upson et al.   â€Å"Karnani and Wernfelt suggested that a â€Å"mutual foothold equilibrium† wherein each of two firms owns a small share of a market that the other dominates can reduce rivalry, because each firm â€Å"has a stick with which to discipline the other firm† (1985: 90).†Ã‚   (Upson et al, 2012, 93) The same logic does apply when two firms own a large share of the market.   If the competitor to the foothold firm makes an attempt to aggregate a larger share of the market, the foothold firm can counter with innovating within the foothold market by adopting a new technique or methodology to the underlying functionality of the technology that is competing in that particular space, for example, server software. The research specific to the contribution of Upson et al is to reduce the space between the knowns and unknowns   known about footholds with respect to potential importance to competition† (Upson et al, 2002, 94†Ã‚  Ã‚   Upson particularly does examine â€Å"how competitor analysis influences foothold attacks and withdrawals.†Ã‚   (Upson et al, 2012, 94) Competitor analysis is therefore a sequential movement of activity between competitor firms that try to gain market share in either their established market or to a foothold market via retaliation. This approach to competitor analysis is interesting to the current business environment due to the focus on entrepreneurialism and on innovation as a means to business success. The second compare and contrast article is entitled ‘Competitor Analysis and Interfirm Rivalry: Toward a Theoretical Integration’, by Chen (1996). The title ostensibly parallels the same framework as the previous study as the interfirm rivalry is likely to refer to direct competitors operating in the same sector within the same industry. The main function of competitive analysis   provides an understanding that allows one to â€Å"predict the rivalry, or interactive market behavior, between firms in their quest for a competitive position in an industry (Caves, 1984; Porter 1980; Scherer Ross, 1990).†Ã‚   (Chen, 1996, 100-101) Chen points to Caves et al research as the primary theoretical approach used to define the causal methodology necessary to identify competitive analysis. The rivalry is therefore considered to be predictable relative to the interactivity of market behavior as firms compete for greater market share in their industry. Chen has chosen the Caves et al research which establishes the rivalry between firms as a means to measure the level of competition through market channel interactions.   The market interactions are analyzed on the premise that rivalries will respond to each move with a more competitive move.   Chen points to competitive analysis research that does not necessarily distinguish the market as either superior or inferior.   The superior market will be the market with larger or the largest market share and the inferior market will be the equivalent of a foothold market or essentially a secondary/auxiliary market. The clumping of market competition will inherently view any move against a rival as relevant to competitor analysis without necessarily distinguishing the response based on the level of market share relative to the market share held by the rival. Porter’s (1980) five force’s is used by Chen to identify the means to which competition is driven.   Porter’s Five Forces, has remained most within academia and out of the perspective of industrial operations. .  Ã‚   Chen isolates the strategic-group approach (Barney et al) as the most relevant to competitor analysis the strategic-group approach (Barney Hoskisson, 1990; McGee Thomas, 1986) is by far the most popular and relevant.†Ã‚   (Chen, 1996, 101) This use of the strategic-group approach within Chen’s theoretical framework   does point to the lack of a market context that researchers apply to the study of competing firms. Competing firms directly engage each other in the market and to the level of direct competition between each competing firm.   The analysis from the research into competitor analysis relative to the findings of Barney et al reveals that a lack of study between the interaction and the direct competitive responses betw een firms. This may have to do with the lack of identification by researchers of the market moves by competing firms in response to interacting market forces and in obtaining greater market share. The focus inherently shifts to areas of competitor analysis that have remained neglected from study.   Areas where researchers previously ignored the market context that drove business decisions relative to rivalries and competitor analysis are inherently under investigation for further clarification. â€Å"Thus far, some of the most fundamental questions in competitor analysis have remained unexplored (Gatignon, 1984; Weitz, 1985). For example, how can researchers studying competition differentiate among players in an industry to explain each player’s market behaviors?† (Chen, 1996, 101) The aforementioned question is inherently the issue with regard to research competitor analysis. Competitor analysis is inclusive of having the ability to differentiate between industry players and their reactions to competitor moves as to whether each move and subsequent move is a function of competitor rivalry. ANALYSIS OF VIEWS The research by Upson et al is essentially subsequent to the Chen research. Upson et al isolates the rivalry response to be within the possibility of the secondary market or the foothold. The identification of the foothold as a means to check the power of a rival firm operating in the primary market of a two-firm rivalry is ostensibly the focus of the Upson et al research which is a complement to the Chen research.   The authors seemingly agree that competitor analysis is a market research based activity that seeks to distinguish the primary, secondary, and tertiary forces.   These forces do enable interlink between industry competitors and further identify industry competitors as possible industry rivals. â€Å"How can a firm, before launching an attack, assess its prebattle relationship with a given rival and the resultant likelihood that this rival would retaliate? How can a firm gauge which opponent is most likely to attack its markets? How can strategists differentiate amon g a set of competitors to allow the firm to allocate appropriate resources and attention to each?† (Chen, 1996, 101) The aforementioned are more relevant to internal firm analysis than external competitor analysis given the weaknesses and threats a firm may face inherent to its industry and market and with respect to the competition. The question posed by Chen of whether a firm will retaliate is interlinked with the Upson et al research regarding the foothold.   The interpretation of the foothold strategy with regard to retaliatory strategy in competitor analysis is that of a leverage tool to have a competitor firm think twice about increasing industry competition in the primary market.   If the rival does not have a market foothold and is inherently weaker in the primary market strategy, a competitor firm may be able to attack the rival firm without retaliation. The importance of establishing a foothold is identified as the primary measure to prevent retaliatory practice and to which a competitor firm does respond to a rival attack.   Ã¢â‚¬Å"Any given foothold is especially valuable as a deterrent in relation to the competitor that has the highest market commonality with the firm that owns the foothold. A focal firm is most vulnerable to rivalrous moves by this competitor; thus, holding a foothold as a hedge against such moves is likely to be seen as useful.† (Upson et al, 2012, 96) The foothold therefore becomes the means of deterrence for rival firms to not pursue attack strategies. The foothold then becomes a defensive tool or mechanism to prevent attacks against the firm from rivals. Even should the foothold lose money, its presence as a possible attack or retaliatory mechanism is perhaps enough of an intrinsic value to protect against losses from an attack where there not a foothold presence in place. Upson et al and Chen draw o n complementary research to provide a contiguous analysis of the issue of competitor analysis. SUMMARY Upson et al and Chen bring to light several issues with respect to competitor analysis. The research presented by the two authors is more comparable than is contrasting with respect to the definition of competitor analysis and the use of competitor analysis in industry and practice. The Upson et al research presents a theory that answers the questions surrounding competitor analysis posed by Chen. The use of a foothold in the market as defined by Upson et al is the retaliatory measure or the gauge to provide a measuring tool to keep the rival from competing too harshly. Chen’s research sought to identify how firms retaliate toward each other as a market move may just be a market move performed by the firm due to the firm seeking to position itself relative to its best interest. Therefore, the move will not inherently be an attack against the rival yet the perception may be that of an attack against the rival to which retaliation may follow. The main comparison between the researchers is the identification of competitor analysis as a direct and indirect means of performing market research relative to the identification of competitive positioning. Upson et al provides the theory of foothold market analysis that complements Chen’s research. Chen will likely agree that use of the foothold is a rival response to a competitor market move as well as use of the foothold as a potential measure of attack to which a retaliatory response in the primary market may follow. The inter market dynamic of competitor firms operating in the same industry and sector is identified by Upson et al and Chen via use of the same scope and measure of framework. The framework of identifying competitor analysis by use of underscoring the firm rivalry and the market moves relative to the market positioning of the rivals is the inter market dynamic that is agreed upon to be the concrete link between the Upson et al and Chen research. The authors share similar business views as they seek to define the underlying causes regarding the rivalry relationship between firms undergoing competitor analysis. The analysis of market activity within the scope of firm rivalries provides a framework to identify market moves and the potential motives behind each market move. Is the firm taking advantage of a market weakness or is the firm attacking a rival? The foothold theory attempts to provide a means to analyze such a question and render an analysis that describes the move with respect to the relationship to the current market position of the rival. The key takeaway is the identification of the importance of market context relative to the firm rivalry interaction and the strategy of each firm as identified by the sequential market move of each firm in the market place. References M-J. Chen, Competitor Analysis and Interfirm Rivalry: Toward a Theoretical Integration. Academy of Management Review Vol. 21. No. 1, 100-134. 1996 http://gatton.uky.edu/Faculty/ferrier/Chen%201996.pdf D Ketchen Jr. A. Ranf, J. Upson, Competitor Analysis and Foothold Moves. Academy of Management Journal Vol. 55. No. 1, 93-110. 2012 http://amj.aom.org/content/55/1/93.full.pdf+html

Element Symbols in Element Names

Element Symbols in Element Names Heres a list of the element names that can be broken down into element symbols. For example, the letters in the element neon are the symbols for Ne, O, N (neon, oxygen, and nitrogen). None of the element names ending in -ium work, so that eliminates many of the element names. ActiniumAluminumAmericiumAntimonyArgonArsenic - Ar Se Ni C, Ar Se N I CAstatine - As Ta Ti NeBariumBerkeliumBerylliumBismuthBohriumBoronBromineCadmiumCalciumCaliforniumCarbon - C Ar B O N, Ca Rb O NCeriumCesiumChlorineChromiumCobaltCoperniciumCopper - Co P P Er, C O P P ErCuriumDarmstadtiumDubniumDysprosiumEinsteiniumErbiumEuropiumFermiumFluorineFranciumGadoliniumGalliumGermaniumGoldHafniumHassiumHeliumHolmiumHydrogenIndiumIodineIridiumIron - Ir O NKrypton - Kr Y Pt O NLanthanumLawrenciumLeadLithiumLutetiumMagnesiumManganeseMeitneriumMendeleviumMercuryMolybdenumNeodymiumNeon - Ne O NNeptuniumNickelNiobiumNitrogenNobeliumOsmiumOxygenPalladiumPhosphorus - P H O S P H O Ru SPlatinumPlutoniumPoloniumPotassiumPraseodymiumPromethiumProtactiniumRadiumRadonRheniumRhodiumRubidiumRutheniumRutherfordiumSamariumScandiumSeaborgiumSeleniumSilicon - Si Li C O N, Si Li Co NSilverSodiumStrontiumSulfurTantalumTechnetiumTelluriumTerbiumThalliumThoriumThuliumTin - Ti NTitaniumTungstenUnunbiumUnunniliumU nunumiumUraniumVanadiumXenon - Xe N O N, Xe No NYtterbiumYttriumZincZirconium

THE FINAL BUSINESS IDEA PLAN PowerPoint Presentation

THE FINAL BUSINESS IDEA PLAN - PowerPoint Presentation Example ized plan is your opportunity to take the weekly assignments and improve them based on the feedback you have received from the instructor and from your classmates from previous weeks. Page 1  -- Cover Sheet with Business Name, and Logo Concept†¨Page 2 –  Mission Statement, Vision Statement, Value Proposition, Business Model (5 points)†¨Page 3  - Market Research Market Needs & Wants, -- Your Competition – Opportunities & Threats & Inspiration!   (5 pts.)†¨Page 4  Ã¢â‚¬â€œNiche Development, Your Ideal Customer   (5 pts.)†¨Page 5  - Products and/or Services, Basic Financials & Sales Strategy– Break-even Analysis (5 pts.)†¨Page 6– Brand Identity – Brand Mood Board, Brand Personality, Logo Concept/Theme   (5points)†¨Page 7–Business Website Plan, Site Map or CMS with Domain (5 points)†¨Page 8  Ã¢â‚¬â€œSocial Media & Marketing Communication Strategy (5 Points)†¨Page 9– Elevator Pitch or 30 Second Commercial (5 Points)†¨Page 10– A To-Do List of Action Items to Complete Post this Class (5

Movie analyzing Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Movie analyzing - Essay Example As such, the business grows quite fast gaining popularity and customer loyalty from the major suppliers in the region. The movie allows viewers to have a comprehension of the setting and everyday encounters of leading a gangster life that generally revolves around criminal activities. Additionally, the movie gives a reflection of the relationship between the police and criminals. It is evident from the story that a successful gangster life is heavily dependent on minimal interactions with law enforcers. As such, Lucas leads a seemingly quiet and private life ensuring minimal interactions with the police despite his successes in both the drug business and purchase of nightclubs. For example, Lucas makes sure to dress in a moderate way that portrays his strength while simultaneously reducing attention levels from law enforcers. This is a typical gangster life scenario where the leaders are seen few times leaving much of the work to their appointed representatives to avoid detection. However, the story does not only concentrate on criminal activities but also touches on the Lucas’s other life such as family. This makes the story more realistic and associable with real life while simultaneously making it interesting. Conversely, the movie also gives a reflection of the police life in a creative yet realistic way thereby striking a balance. The lead detective, Roberts, is given the task of apprehending the major drug traffickers in the city after the death of his partner. Although at first Lucas is unknown to the detective, he attracts attention during a fighting event due to his conspicuous dressing and sitting position prompting Roberts to embark on a mission to investigate him. Within the same period Lucas’ business encounters some challenges from Dominic, a mafia boss, and some corrupt detectives who demand to be given a cut from

The Theory of the Forms as Portrayed Throughout Plato`s Dialogues Essay Example for Free

The Theory of the Forms as Portrayed Throughout Plato`s Dialogues Essay Prologue to Plato’s Theory of Forms Plato’s Theory of Forms suggests the dichotomy between the material world and the world of ideas. In the Republic, Plato clearly delineates the difference between the two by first arguing that the material world, or the world which we live in, is not a perfect world and one that is full of error. On the other hand, the world of ideas is the perfect world. In such world, the Forms exist. The forms are the perfect entities upon which the structure or the essence of the material objects in the world are based. That is, the forms serve as the foundation not only of the physical structure of the objects in the world but also of the true composition of things apart from their corporeal composition. The forms correspond to the â€Å"blueprints† of the worldly objects. The argument of Plato that the forms are the bases for the essence and, hence, the composition of things consequently implies the argument that the forms have a higher degree of significance than the worldly objects. Part of the reason to this is the notion that without these forms the corresponding corporeal objects in the material world will not come into existence. Thus, the primacy of the forms is held with significant value throughout the philosophy of Plato. Moreover, Plato argues that one cannot exactly derive the essence of things in the material objects themselves for the reason that these objects do not inherently have in them their â€Å"essence†. Although to a certain degree one may be inclined to claim that the worldly objects manifest the essence they intrinsically hold through the use of the sense, Plato thinks otherwise. One reason to this argument is the Platonic belief that our senses cannot give us a full and accurate account of the nature of things. Though our senses of perception may provide us with immediate perception on the objects which are within the proximity of our consciousness, Plato contends that our senses are so limited that we cannot actually grasp in full detail what it is that these objects hold in themselves. Further, even if we are able to sensibly acquire the sensory manifestation of these objects, it remains that we are still bereft of the essence of these objects because they do not have in them the essence that provides for the very structure of their existence. However, we must be reminded that Plato suggests that man essentially holds within him the genuine form of knowledge and the understanding of the world. This is what man basically possesses within him, something which is so intrinsic that it cannot have been originally from beyond man himself. Further, knowledge for Plato is a type of recollection wherein each individual is reminded of the forms through his or her sensory experience of the objects in the world. In his allegory of the cave, Plato further strengthens his claim on the primacy of the forms and the failure of the conventions set forth by the senses to provide us with the knowledge on the essence of things. Citing that human beings are like prisoners in a cave who have not seen the â€Å"reality† of the objects that they merely perceive as shadows, Plato goes on to argue that we ought to be relinquished from such a fixed state. Consequently, once man finds himself liberated from the chains that have tied him down inside the cave, he then can begin to ascend out of the cave and into the world â€Å"outside†. The transformation does not easily arrive at a point of full realization for the reason that man’s eyes will apparently be hurt by the light coming from the sun. Thus, it can be emphasized that Plato suggests that the process of acquiring true knowledge is one which is not an easy task and may hurt the sensibilities of man. Part of the reason to this is the fact that man throughout the course of his life has been so acquainted with the seeming knowledge of things given to him through convention that he tends to easily accept what is offered by his senses without even beginning to question the validity of these sensory experiences. Nevertheless, Plato holds that our sensory experiences also hold an initial role in the process of realizing genuine knowledge. It is through our very experiences that we get immediate understanding of the empirical existence of objects and that these events serve as the starting point of the far more noble task of obtaining true knowledge beyond the confines of human convention. For the most part of Plato’s theoretical framework on the essence of objects and the acquisition of true knowledge, one can begin to assess these concepts in terms of their validity through logic. That is, if indeed what we are merely able to grasp through sensory experiences are those which are simply based on the corporeal existence of objects and not strictly on their â€Å"essential† level, the question remains as to how exactly will we, as human beings, be able to arrive at true knowledge. Or far more importantly, the more fundamental question is on how we can be able to even begin the â€Å"painstaking† task of gaining the essence of things. If we are to adopt Plato’s scheme in arriving at the understanding of the forms in the world of forms, one should critically assess the measures that must be done and the goals that must be met in the long run. Having this as guidance will lessen sensory deterrence to the task of grasping the forms. In conclusion, Plato’s theory on the distinction between the world of forms and the visible or material world is one which sharply demarcates the limits of the senses. It brings into light the argument that human beings, as essentially endowed with sensory capabilities, cannot escape the error brought forth by the limits of the senses. Nevertheless, even with the imperfectness of man’s senses, one has no other starting point in advancing a grander goal than through these basic senses. The world of ideas may or may not actually exist, but the far more important question is whether indeed the material world cannot provide us the essence of things and that beyond the sense everything is in perfect state. Socratic Forms Socrates believes that correct answers to ‘What is F?’ questions specify forms; forms are the objects of definition where, as we have seen, definitions are real definitions. The ontological correlates of real definitions are real essences, non-linguistic universals that explain why things are as they are. Anything that is gold, for example, has the real essence of gold and is gold precisely because it has that real essence. So, as Socrates says, the one thing by which all Fs are F is a form (Euthyphro 5d1–5; Meno 72c7). Or again, he says that the form of piety is some one thing, the same in (en; Eu. 5d1–2; cf. Ch. 159a1–2, 158e7) everything that is pious; it is that feature of things by which they are pious. On the account I have been suggesting, Socrates offers an epistemological argument for the existence of forms: the possibility of knowledge requires explanation, and this, in turn, requires the existence of forms—real properties and kinds. He also offers a metaphysical one over many arguments for the existence of forms: the existence of many Fs requires the existence of some one thing, the form of F, in virtue of which they are F.[i] David Armstrong has usefully distinguished between realist and semantic one over many arguments.21 Realist one over many arguments posit universals to explain sameness of nature; if a group of objects are all F, they are F in virtue of sharing a genuine property, the property of F. (A predicate nominalist, by contrast, would say that they are all F because the predicate ‘F’ is true of them all; we need not postulate a genuine property that they all share.) Semantic one over many arguments posits universals to explain the meanings of general terms and, indeed, universals just are the meanings of those terms. On the account of Socrates that I have provided, he offers not a semantic but a realist one over many arguments. For, as we have seen, he wants to know not the meanings of general terms, but the properties in virtue of which things are as they are. If forms are properties whose range and nature are determined by explanatory considerations rather than by considerations about meaning, then they are not meanings, if meanings are taken to be something other than properties conceived in realist fashion. But might Socrates view forms as meanings, and take (some) meanings to be properties? He presumably would do so if he accepted a referential theory of meaning. However, it has been cogently argued that Socrates takes the virtue terms to be non-synonymous but co-referential, so he cannot consistently accept a referential theory of meaning.[ii] But is Socrates inconsistent? Or does he confusedly view forms not only as properties but also as meanings, where meanings are taken to be something other than properties? It is difficult to be sure, since he does not discuss semantic questions. But so far as I can see, he does not suggest that forms play any semantic role.[iii] If Socrates relies on a realist one over many arguments, then he presumably takes every property to be a form. To be sure, he does not explicitly say how many forms there are; as Aristotle says, Socrates is primarily interested in the virtues. But he never suggests a principle that restricts forms to a subclass of properties; and he sometimes explains why each of the virtues is some one thing, and so a form, by appealing to quite heterogeneous sorts of cases.[iv] Although Socrates seems to believe that every property is a form, he is not committed to the view that every predicate denotes a form. For, again, forms are explanatory properties, and not every predicate denotes an explanatory property. In addition to suggesting that Socratic forms are universals conceived as explanatory properties, and that on Socrates’ view knowledge of them is necessary for having any knowledge at all, Aristotle also claims that Socrates did not take forms to be either non-sensible or separate. I turn now to these claims. One might argue that Aristotle is wrong to say that Socrates did not take forms to be non-sensible; on the ground that Socrates routinely rejects answers to ‘What is F?’ questions that are phrased in terms of behavior or action-types. Moreover, at least in the case of the virtues he seems to favor accounts that are phrased in terms of certain states of the soul and these, it might be thought, are not observable. It might then be tempting to infer that Socrates believes that a correct answer to a ‘What is F?’ question must specify a non-observable property, a property not definable in observational terms. However, although Socrates regularly rejects answers to ‘What is F?’ questions that are phrased in observational terms, he never says that they fail because they are so phrased. They fail, as we have seen, because they are too narrow or too broad, or because they are not explanatory; but Socrates does not link these failures to the fact that the answers are phrased in observational terms. He leaves open the possibility that although the proposed accounts fail, some other account phrased in observational terms might be satisfactory. This, however, is enough to vindicate Aristotle if he means only that Socrates does not explicitly say that forms are non-sensible, and so in that sense is not committed to the claim that they are; and that seems to be all Aristotle means.[v] What, now, about separation? Discussions of separation are difficult, partly because ‘separation’ is used differently by different people. I shall follow Aristotles lead and say that A is separate from B just in case A can exist without B—that is, just in case A can exist whether or not B exists or, equivalently, just in case A exists independently of B.[vi] Separation so defined is a modal notion; if A is separate from B, A can exist whether or not B exists. (Hence A can be separate from B even if A never actually exists when B does not.) Separation so defined is also a relational notion: to be separate is always to be separate from something. In the case of forms, the relevant ‘something’ is sensible particulars (Met. 1086b4, 8).[vii] So Socratic forms are separate just in case they can exist whether or not there are any corresponding sensible particulars. If forms are universals, then to say that they are separate is to say that they can exist uninstantiated by the corresponding sensible particulars.[viii] Socrates never explicitly says or denies that forms are separate; nor do his ways of characterizing forms seem to commit him one way or the other. He says, for example, that forms are in things (e.g. Eu. 5d1–2). But to say that forms are in things is only to say that various sensible have them, i.e. have the relevant properties. It does not follow from the fact that sensibles have properties that those properties are not separate, i.e. cannot exist unless some corresponding sensible particulars instantiate them.[ix] Other evidence seems equally indeterminate. This, however, is enough to vindicate Aristotles claim that Socrates did not separate universals, i.e. forms, if, as seems to be the case, he means only that Socrates is not committed to separation.[x] I close my discussion of Socrates by considering two further claims about forms—that they are self-predicative and that they are paradigms. Although Aristotle does not mention these claims in connection with Socrates, they are important in understanding both Plato and also Aristotles criticism of him in the Peri ideÃ… n; and we can get a better grip on Plato’s version of these claims if we look first at Socrates’ version. Socrates believes that the form of F cannot be both F and not F; that is, it cannot suffer narrow compresence with respect to F-ness. It can avoid being both F and not F in one of two ways: by being neither F nor not F, or by being F without also being not F. Although the evidence is meager, Socrates seems to favor the latter option; he seems to believe, that is, that the form of piety is pious, the form of justice is just, and so on. He thus seems to accept self-predication (SP), the thesis that any form of F is itself F.[xi] It no doubt sounds odd to say that the form of justice is just, and it may not be correct to do so. But the claim is more intelligible than it may initially appear to be. We have seen that Socrates says that various action-types and character-traits are F and not F—endurance, for example, is both courageous and not courageous. He does not mean that endurance is courageous or not courageous in the very same way in which a person might be; the property of endurance, for example, does not itself stand firm in battle. Rather, endurance is courageous and not courageous in so far as it explains why some things are courageous and why other things are not.[xii] Socrates believes, that is, that if x explains y’s being F, then x is itself F, though not necessarily in the very same way in which y is F; rather, x is (or may be) F in a sui generis way, simply in virtue of its explanatory role.[xiii] We can understand self-predications along the same lines. Forms are properties; the form of justice, for example, is the property of justice. Socrates believes that it is the single feature by which all and only just things are just; it is the ultimate source or explanation of what is just about just things, and it never explains why anything is not just. Socrates does not mean that it is just in the very same way in which Aristides was; he means that it is just simply in virtue of its explanatory role. On this view, Socrates has unusually generous criteria for being included in the class of Fs; something can be a member of the class of Fs by being the source or explanation of something’s being F in the ordinary way. We might well object to these criteria; but they do not commit Socrates to the view that the form of justice, for example, can win moral medals.[xiv] On behalf of this account of self-predication, it is worth noting that we readily predicate (e.g.) ‘justice’ in the ‘ordinary’ way of categorically different types of things—of, for example, people, acts, institutions, laws, and the like. So perhaps predicating it of the property of justice is not as radical a departure from ordinary usage as it may initially seem to be. Further, we have seen that Socrates is not shy about revising our pre-analytic beliefs; so perhaps one new belief he wants us to acquire is that the form of F is itself F. We have seen that Socrates believes that the one thing by which all Fs are F is the form of F; he also takes this one thing to be a paradigm (paradeigma, Eu. 6e4–5), so that by looking to it (apoblepein eis; Eu. 6e4) one can know of any given thing whether or not it is F. Plato and Aristotle use paradeigma in a variety of ways. Often, for example, they use it simply to mean ‘example’.[xv] Aristotle once calls his own forms paradigms (Phys. 194b26 = Met. 1013a27), by which he seems to mean that they are the formal—structural or functional—properties of things; as such, they are explanatory natures. But as we shall see, he believes that Platonic forms are paradigms in a different, and objectionable, sense. When Socrates says that forms are paradigms, he seems to mean only that they are standards in the sense that in order to know whether x is F, one must know, and refer to, the form of F. For x is F if and only if it has the property, i.e. form, of F; so in order to know that x is F, one needs to know what F is and use that knowledge in explaining how it is that x is F. (So paradigmatism and self-predication are closely linked. The form of F is F because it explains the F-ness of things; forms are also paradigms in virtue of their explanatory role.) I shall call this weak paradigmatism. As I interpret Socrates, he introduces forms for epistemological and metaphysical, but not for semantic reasons. Further, Socratic forms are universals in the sense that they are explanatory properties. The fact that they are self-predicative paradigms does not jeopardize their status as explanatory properties; on the contrary, they are self-predicative paradigms because they are explanatory properties. Compresence, Knowledge, and Separation Why does Plato take the compresence of opposites to require the existence of non-sensible forms that escape compresence? Aristotle rightly says that the reasons are metaphysical and epistemological. The metaphysical reason is especially prominent in the famous aitia-passage in the Phaedo (96a ff.), where Plato lays out criteria for adequate explanations. In his view, if x is F and not F, it cannot explain why anything is F; it cannot, in other words, be that in virtue of which anything is F. Since some sensible properties of F suffer compresence, reference to them does not explain why anything is F, and so they cannot be what F-ness is. Since explanation is possible, in these cases things are F in virtue of a non-sensible property, the form of F. So Plato concludes that ‘if anything else is beautiful besides the beautiful itself, it is so for no other reason than that it participates in the beautiful’ (Phaedo 100c4–6). Or again, it is not because of ‘bright color or shape or anything else of that sort’ (100d1–2) that anything is beautiful; rather ‘it is because of the beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful’ (100d7–8). For sensible properties suffer compresence in so far as bright color, for example, is sometimes beautiful, sometimes ugly. In Plato, the Socratic view that the form of F is the one thing by which all Fs are F becomes the view that forms are aitiai, causal or explanatory factors—at least in certain cases, things are as they are because they participate in non-sensible forms that escape compresence. This metaphysical reason for positing forms has epistemological repercussions. For like Socrates, Plato thinks that knowledge requires explanation;[xvi] since he believes that in at least some cases explanation requires reference to forms, he also believes that in these cases one can have knowledge only if one knows the relevant forms. Since knowledge in these cases is possible, there must be forms. This epistemological reason for positing forms is especially prominent in Rep. 5–7, where Plato asks the ‘What is F?’ question and assumes that one needs to know what F is in order to know anything about F—where, as with Socrates, the knowledge at issue is knowledge as it contrasts with belief, and where definitions are real definitions.[xvii] The sight-lovers believe that we can answer the question ‘What is beauty?’ by simply mentioning the many beautifuls (ta polla kala, 479d3)—sensible properties like bright color. For in their view each such sensible property explains some range of cases. Bright color, for example, explains what makes this Klee painting beautiful; somber color explains what makes this Rembrandt painting beautiful; and so on. Against the sight-lovers, Plato points out that each such property suffers compresence since (e.g.) some brightly colored things are beautiful, others are ugly. In his view, if x is F and not F, it cannot explain why anything is F; so no such property can explain why anything is beautiful. Further, in his view as in Socrates’, we can explain why Fs are F only if F-ness is some one thing (479d3), the same in all cases; so F-ness cannot be a disjunction of properties. It is therefore a single non-sensible property, the form of F. This is required, in Platos view, by the possibility of knowledge. Like Socrates, then, Plato posits forms as universals whose existence is necessary for explanation and so for the possibility of knowledge. He also agrees with Socrates that F-ness itself cannot be not F. Unlike Socrates, however, Plato insists that forms are non-sensible. A related difference is that Socrates countenances a form for every property. But as Plato points out in, for example, Rep. 7 (523–5), only some predicates have sensible instances that suffer narrow compresence—‘thick’ and ‘thin’ are such predicates, but ‘finger’ is not. Like Socrates’ arguments for the existence of forms, Plato’s argument from compresence posits forms to explain, not the meaningfulness of general terms or linguistic understanding or even belief, but the possibility of explanation and knowledge. Indeed, the sight-lovers in Rep. 5 have rather sophisticated beliefs even though they do not countenance forms. Similarly, in Rep. 7 (523–5) sight can identify examples of thick and thin things, of hard and soft things; what it cannot do is define thickness and thinness, hardness and softness. For it is confined, naturally enough, to sensible properties, but in Platos view one cannot define thickness and thinness and so on in such terms.[xviii] Nor does the argument from compresence take forms to be particulars. Like Socrates, Plato assumes that a correct answer to a ‘What is F?’ question will specify the property of F. His interlocutors generally seem to agree; at least, their answers are typically phrased in terms of properties (e.g. bright color). The dispute between Plato and his interlocutors is about the nature of various properties: the sight-lovers take them to be sensible; Plato takes them to be non-sensible forms. The argument from compresence takes forms to be the basic objects of knowledge—one must know them in order to have any knowledge at all. It does not follow that forms are the only objects of knowledge. Nor is it clear why the fact that something suffers compresence should make it unknowable. Since bright color is both beautiful and ugly, it cannot be what beauty is; but it does not follow that we cannot know that bright color is both beautiful and ugly, or that something is brightly colored. Yet it is often thought that Plato takes sensibles to be unknowable, and it is often thought that Aristotle interprets Plato in this way. I have argued elsewhere, however, that Plato is committed only to the claim that forms are the basic objects of knowledge, in the sense that in order to know anything at all one must know them; he leaves open the possibility that if one knows them one can use that knowledge in such a way as to acquire knowledge of other things. It is tempting to suppose that Aristotle agrees. To be sure, Met. 1. 6 and 13.4 can be read as saying that Plato takes whatever changes to be unknowable. But perhaps Aristotle means only that Plato takes whatever changes to be unknowable in itself, independently of its relation to forms, so that whatever changes cannot be the basic object of definition or knowledge. Met. 13. 9 seems congenial to this interpretation. For Aristotle says there that ‘it is not possible to acquire knowledge without the universal’—a claim that plainly leaves open the possibility of knowing more than universals. Further, although he repeats the claim that Plato thinks that sensibles are always changing, he does not say that in Platos view that makes them unknowable. So perhaps Aristotle means to commit Plato only to the claim that forms are the basic objects of knowledge. The argument from compresence shows that forms are different from both sensible particulars and sensible properties. But it does not show that forms are separate, i.e. that they can exist whether or not the corresponding sensible particulars exist. Difference does not imply separation. Yet it is sometimes thought that Plato, both in fact and in Aristotles view, argues in this invalid way. The Metaphysics passages, however, do not saddle Plato with this invalid argument. Met. 1.6 says only that flux (i.e. on my interpretation, compresence) shows that forms are different (hetera; cf. Phaedo 74a11, c7) from sensibles; separation is not mentioned. In 13.4, Aristotle says that Plato separated forms; but he does not say why Plato did so. He mentions separation not as the conclusion of an argument, but simply as a distinguishing feature of the Platonic theory. In 13.9, however, Aristotle explains (III (1–6); see sect. 2) that Plato inferred from the flux of sensibles that there must be forms conceived as non-sensible universals that are the basic objects of knowledge and definition. He adds (III (8–10)) that Plato took forms to be substances, i.e. basic beings; since substances must be separate, forms are separate. Aristotle seems to believe, then, that the ‘flux argument’ shows only that forms are non-sensible universals that are the basic objects of knowledge and definition; that forms are separate follows only with the aid of further premises. These further premises give Plato a valid argument for separation. I think Aristotle is right not to claim that Plato argues from the flux of sensibles to the separation of forms; at least, Plato never does so explicitly.[xix] But is Aristotle right to say that Plato takes forms to be separate, if for other reasons? It is difficult to be sure. For one thing, Plato never says that forms are separate; he never, that is, uses any form or cognate of ‘chÃ… rizein’ of forms, at least not in the relevant sense.[xx] Nor do any of his explicit arguments imply that forms are separate. In the Timaeus, however, Plato seems to be committed to separation. For he says there that forms are everlasting and that the cosmos is not everlasting; there has always been a form of man, but there has not always been particular men. It follows that the form of man existed before the cosmos came into being, and so it existed when there were no sensible particular men; hence it can exist whether or not they do, and so it is separate. Now in the middle dialogues Plato sometimes says that forms are everlasting. But he does not say that the cosmos is not everlasting, so the Timaeus route to separation is not mentioned.[xxi] Indeed, nothing said in the middle dialogues seems to me to involve clear commitment to separation. None the less, separation fits well with the tenor of the middle dialogues, and the casual way in which separation emerges in the Timaeus perhaps suggests that Plato takes it for granted. So I shall assume that Aristotle is right to say that Plato separated forms, though it is important to be clear that Plato never argues, or even says, that forms are separate. Aristotle argues that since forms are separate, they are particulars (13. 9). Since he also takes forms to be universals, he concludes that forms are both universals and particulars. But as I (following Aristotle) understand separation, the claim that forms—universals—are separate is simply the claim that they can exist whether or not any corresponding sensible particulars exist. Why does Aristotle take this to show that forms are particulars? The answer is that he believes that universals exist when and only when they are instantiated; in his view, only substance particulars are separate (see e.g. Met. 1028a33–4). So he claims that if forms are separate they are (substance) particulars because he accepts the controversial view that universals cannot exist uninstantiated. He is therefore not convicting Plato of internal inconsistency: he means that Platos views do not square with the truth. He sees that Plato introduces forms simply to be universals; that they are particulars results only if we accept the controversial Aristotelian assumption, which Aristotle takes Plato to reject, that universals cannot exist uninstantiated. Aristotles complaints about separation therefore rely on one of the argumentative strategies as he intrudes into Platonism assumptions he accepts but that he thinks Plato rejects. Once we see that this is what Aristotle is doing, we can see that although he claims that forms are particulars, there is a sense in which he agrees with me that they are, or are intended to be, only universals. References: Allen, R. E. Platos Parmenides. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. Beck, Maximilian. Platos Problem in the Parmenides. Journal of the History of Ideas.8 (1947): 232-36. Brandwood, Leonard. The Chronology of Platos Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Cornford, F. M. Plato and Parmenides. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939. Fowler, H. N. Plato-Statesman. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1925. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy. Trans. Christopher Smith: New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Guthrie, W. K. C. A History of Greek Philosophy. Vol. 5: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Miller, Mitchell H. Platos Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul Reprint ed: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991. Miller, Mitchell, Jr. The Philosopher in Platos Statesman. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980. Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Plato. Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus Trans. H. N. Fowler: Loeb Classical Library 1999. . Great Dialogues of Plato. Trans. W. H. D. Rouse. Reissue ed: Signet Classics, 1999. . The Republic. Trans. Desmond Lee. Ed. Rachana Kamtekar. 2nd ed: Penguin Classics, 2003. . Theaetetus. Kessinger Publishing, 2004. Rochol, Hans. The Dialogue Parmenides: An Insoluble Enigma in Platonism? International Philosophical Quarterly.11 (1971): 496-520. Sayre, Kenneth. Platos Late Ontology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. [i] Plato never uses the phrase ‘one over many’ (hen epi pollÃ… n; hen para polla). But he contrasts the one and the many, and he sometimes says that forms are para various things. (Parm. 132a11–12 has epi toutois au pasin heteron; 132c3 has some one thing which is epi pasin.) [ii] See Penner, ‘The Unity of Virtue’, and Irwin, PMT, ch. 3. See also C. C. W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (Oxford, 1976), 103–8 (though Taylor is less sure than Penner and Irwin are that Socrates is clear about the difference between sense and reference; see pp. 106–7). In ‘Plato on Naming’, Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (1977), 289–301, I in effect argue that Crat.—which contains an extended discussion of names, and of language more generally—does not involve a referential theory of meaning, or confuse sense and reference. If Crat. articulates Socrates views, then it provides further evidence that he is not committed to a referential theory of meaning and does not confuse sense and reference. By contrast, Vlastos, ‘The Unity of the Virtues’, 227, claims that neither Socrates nor Plato ever distinguishes between sense and reference. [iii] White, Plato on Knowledge and Reality, 9, agrees that semantic considerations are not ‘wholly explicit’ in the Socratic dialogues, but he believes that Meno 72–4 and Eu. 5c8–d5 suggest such considerations ‘less openly’. On the account of these passages that I have defended, however, they are not semantic. For both passages concern the ‘What is F?’ question, which asks not for the meaning of ‘F’, but for a real definition of F. Perhaps in mentioning the Meno passage, White has in mind 74d5–6, where Socrates tells Meno that since he calls various things by the name ‘shape’, Meno should be able to tell him what shape is. But Socrates seems to mean only that since Meno thinks that there are various shapes, he should be able to tell Socrates what shape is—it is the fact that the name applies to something, rather than the fact that there is such a name, that suggests that shape is something. To say that if a name, ‘F’, applies to something, there is such a thing as F-ness does not imply that every general term denotes a property or form, or that forms are the meanings of the terms to which they correspond, or even that forms are relevant to explaining the meanings of general terms. [iv] In La. 192ab, for example, Socrates argues that just as speed is some one thing, so too is courage. In Meno 72a–74a, he argues that just as being a bee is some one thing, so too is virtue. [v] Allen, by contrast, thinks that Met. 1. 6 ‘implies that Socrates identified the objects of definition with sensibles, which is another way of saying that he did not distinguish Forms from their instances’ (Platos Euthyphro, 134; cf. 136). But Met. 1. 6 says only that Socrates did not take them to be non-sensible, which leaves open the possibility that Socrates did not take them to be sensible either—he was uncommitted either way. Even if Aristotle means that Socrates took the objects of definition to be sensible, it would not follow that he thought that Socrates did not distinguish them from sensible particulars (which is what Allen seems to mean by ‘instances’). For Aristotle believes that there are not only sensible particulars but also sensible or observable properties or universals (see Ch. 2.4). And in Met. 13. 9, he commends Socrates for acknowledging the existence of universals as entities distinct from particulars, since ‘it is not possible to acquire knowledge without the universal’ (1086b5–6). If Aristotle claims both that Socrates recognized the existence of universals and also that he took them to be sensible, then the sensibles at issue here should be sensible universals rather than sensible particulars. [vi] I take ‘A exists independently of B’ to be equivalent to ‘A can exist whether or not B exists’. To say that A is separate from B is compatible with saying that B is separate from A. If A is separate from B but B is not separate from A, then A is not only separate from but also ontologically prior to B. Ontological priority implies separation, but separation does not imply ontological priority. [vii] In these two passages, ‘kath’ hekasta’ and ‘aisthÄ“ta’ denote only particulars.. [viii] Hence the claim that forms are separate is weaker than the claim that they can exist uninstantiated tout court. If forms can exist uninstantiated, they are separate, but the converse is not true. [ix] If Socrates believes that a form can exist only if it is in something, then he rejects separation; for the view that he believes this, see Vlastos, Socrates, 74; cf. pp. 55–66, 72–80. (By contrast, in ‘The Unity of the Virtues’, 252, Vlastos says that Socratic forms or universals are not ‘ontological dependencies of persons’; this seems to say that they exist independently of sensible particulars, in which case they are separate.) But although Socrates assumes that forms are in things, I do not see that he commits himself to the view that they would not exist unless they were in things. [x] By contrast, Allen, Platos Euthyphro, 136, argues that Socrates separated forms. [xi] See e.g. Prot. (330c3–e2, where justice is said to be just, and piety pious); HMa. 291d1–3 (beauty ‘will never appear ugly to anyone anywhere’—though even if it never appears ugly, it does not follow that it appears beautiful); Eu. 5d1–5 (the eidos of piety is pious) and, possibly, Eu. 5d1–5 (but cf. Vlastos, Socrates, 57 n. 48); Lys. 217ce. As I go on to suggest, commitment to self-predication also seems to be tacit or assumed elsewhere. [xii] More precisely, Socrates believes that endurance no more explains why one thing is courageous than why another thing is not. For in his view the only real—or, at least, the ultimate—explanation of anythings being F is the one thing by which all Fs are F. But it will be convenient to speak as I do in the text. [xiii] To say that if x explains ys being F, it is itself F, though perhaps in a different way from the way in which y is F, is not to say that x and y are F in different senses of ‘F’. To illustrate the difference between different ways of being F and different senses of ‘F’: horses and cows are animals in different ways, but ‘animal’ means the same in ‘Horses are animals’ and in ‘Cows are animals’. ‘Seal’, however, means something different as applied to the seals in a zoo and the Great Seal of the United States; see S. Peterson, ‘A Reasonable Self-Predication Premise for the Third Man Argument’, Philosophical Review, 82 (1973), 451–70 at 464. I elaborate on this point below in discussing Plato on SP; see also Chs. 10, 15, and 16. If xs explaining ys being F is a sui generis way of being F, then Socrates view of self-predication is not refuted by the fact that e.g. saccharine tastes bitter but makes other things taste sweet. Nor does saccharine therefore suffer narrow compresence of opposites, since it is not both sweet and bitter in virtue of some one and the same aspect of itself. It is sweet because it makes other things taste sweet; it is bitter because of its own taste. [xiv] C. C. W. Taylor interprets Socrates notion of self-predication in a somewhat similar way, saying that ‘if justice is seen as a force in a man causing him to act justly, it is by no means obviously nonsensical to describe it .  .  . as just’ (pp. 119–20; contrast pp. 112–13). See also Irwin, PMT 306 n. 6. However, they seem to think that Socrates takes the form of justice, for example, to be just in the very same way in which a person is just. [xv] In Plato, see e.g. Ap. 23b1; Gorg. 525c6–7; So. 251a7; Phdr. 262c9; Pol. 277d1; Laws 663e9. In Aristotle, see e.g. Top. 151b21, 157a14, 15. [xvi] For Platos insistence that knowledge requires an account, see Phd. 76b4–6, Rep. 531e4–5, 534b3–6, Tm. 51e3. Passages in which Plato asks the ‘What is F?’ question also assume that knowledge requires an account; for he believes that one needs to know what F is in order to know anything about F, and knowing what F is involves knowing an account of it. For references to places where Plato asks the ‘What is F?’ question, see below and the next note. (In all these passages, the relevant sort of account involves explaining the natures of the relevant entities; but see n. 17.) [xvii] For references to the ‘What is F?’ question, see e.g. Rep. 523d4–5, 524c11, e6. In Rep. 5 Plato infers from the fact that the sight-lovers do not know what beauty is that they know nothing about beauty; this assumes that one needs to know what F is in order to know anything about F. I discuss Rep. 5 further in Ch. 7. For a more detailed discussion, see my ‘Knowledge and Belief in Republic V’, Archiv fà ¼r Geschichte der Philosophic 60 (1978), 121–39, and ‘Knowledge and Belief in Republic V–VII’, in S. Everson (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought, i: Epistemology (Cambridge, 1990), 85–115. [xviii] Rep. 523–5 is sometimes thought to concern not definitions of properties but identification of examples. For some discussion, see Irwin, PMT, ch. 6, esp. 318 n. 26, and 320–1 n. 39. I discuss this matter further, though still briefly, in ‘The One over Many’ and in ‘Plato on Perception’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supplementary volume (1988), 15–28. [xix] In Phd. 74a9–c5, for example, he infers from the fact that sensible equals are equal and unequal that there must be a form of equal that is different from, non-identical with, sensible equals. Separation is not mentioned. [xx] Neither Tm. nor the middle dialogues use any form or cognate of ‘chÃ… rizein’ of forms. In Parm., Plato says that ‘similarity itself exists separately (chÃ… ris) from the similarity we ourselves have’ (130b4); Vlastos, Socrates, 259–61, takes him to mean that forms exist independently of sensibles, i.e. can exist whether or not they do. However, in the just preceding lines Plato asks: ‘Have you yourself, as you say, distinguished in this way, on the one hand, separately certain forms themselves, on the other, separately, in turn, the t hings which participate in them?’ (130b1–3). Here he suggests, not that forms exist independently of sensibles, but that they can be distinguished separately from them, just as sensibles can in their turn be distinguished separately from forms. 130b4 seems to illustrate this general point by way of a particular example; it does not make a new point about existential independence. [xxi] Actual uninstantiation is sufficient but not necessary for separation. My point is that unlike Tm., the middle dialogues are not clearly committed to this particular sufficient condition. Rep. 10 has a form of bed. If it is everlasting, presumably it has not always been instantiated, since presumably there have not always been sensible beds, in which case it is separate.

constitutional law Essay -- essays research papers

Constitutional Law Marbury v. Madison Marbury v. Madison, one of the first Supreme Court cases asserting the power of judicial review, is an effective argument for this power; however, it lacks direct textual basis for the decision. Marshall managed to get away with this deficiency because of the silence on many issues and the vague wording of the Constitution. During the early testing period when few precedents existed, there was much debate about fundamental issues concerning what was intended by the words of the Constitution and which part of government should have the final word in defining the meaning of these words. Marshall used the Marbury case to establish the Supreme Court's place as the final judge. Marshall identified three major questions that needed to be answered before the Court could rule on the Marbury v. Madison case. The first of these was, "Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?" The Constitution allows that "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, . . . " (Art. II, Â § 2). The Judiciary Act of 1793 had given the President the right to appoint federal judges and justices of the peace; there is no dispute that such an appointment was within the scope of the president's powers. Debate arises because the Constitution is silent on the exact time at which the appointment is considered complete. The Supreme Court ruled that "when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete, when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the [secretary of state]." This ruling does not have direct constitutional support, but it is not an unreasonable decision. The second question which Marshall addressed was, "If [Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of this country afford him a remedy?" The answer is logically yes although there are no specific words in the Constitution to support such an answer. Based on the type of government intended by the Constitution, the government is expected to protect individual liberty. As Marshall says, "[The government] will certainly cea... ...urthermore, the president also was not in a position to allow the federal government more leeway in interpreting their powers. He does not make any laws of his own and has no power to settle any questions of the states. Clearly, the Supreme Court was the branch that could most easily facilitate the strengthening of the national government into an effective and unified nation rather than thirteen independent countries as the states had seemed under the Articles of Confederation. Critics will protest that the people do not elect the Supreme Court Justices and therefore the Supreme Court should not have the power of judicial review. As McCloskey points out, "No institution in a democratic society could become and remain potent unless it could count on a solid block of public opinion that would rally to it's side in a pinch." Clearly, the Supreme Court is ultimately responsible to the will of the people. By maintaining independence from politics, the Justices avoid the major problems of political parties and party platforms. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's small size allows the Constitution to speak with a unified voice throughout the country.

Fall of the Gas Giant

Fall of the gas giant Name:Source of article: the NEW YORK TIMES Publication date: 10th April 2018 The ripples effects of the tariff imposed on steel and aluminum from china has been felt all over the country since the beginning of their implantation late last year. Many steel companies based the United States have decried the move as it has adversely affected their businesses. The question that lingers in their thoughts is, ‘how long will we survive the turmoil?'. It was passed that a 25% tariff be imposed. One company that has clearly showed its disgust in this status quo is CP industries; it is one of the largest companies that manufacture steel products with its raw materials sourced from china. CP industries make steel gas cylinders and sell them to government parastatals like NASA and the public. Its manager claims that since the tariff came into place they had to raise the price on its products and they have ended up losing customers to competitor companies from china.From the managers cry rose another creepy question, ‘who will pay for the taxes?'. A discussion by economics professionals claimed the American companies will have to bear that burden stoically if they intend in retaining their supplier. A Competitor that the popular industry faces is the Enric Gas Equipment Company from china. Goods from the company are not subjected to the tariff yet they meet the same customer. That is unfavorable competition.I strongly stand with the economists that claim that the tariff should be toned down if not removed completely. In all goods that the government could put tariffs on; aluminum and steel were to be excluded. This is for the simple reason that the country does not produce cheap high quality steel like china. Many critics have rallied against the tariffs as the economy is predicted to see a dive in the coming years. PWhat will happen to the CP industry and all other small companies that import Chinese steel if the tariff is to be upheld for 3 more years?Protectionism as a policy under economics field should be clearly defined by states that want to adopt it. The laws around it must be custom made to ensure that its intended aim of boosting market for domestic companies is met. If not, we will see a collapse of many giant companies and the loss will be immeasurable and irreversible. ReferenceOnline article by the NEW YORK TIMEShttps://mobile.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/business

Baroque Notes

Oldest of the three people known as the Carried * Cousin of Agitations and Enable * Studied painting in Florence * Taught his cousins Agitations (1557- 1602) * Known better as a printmaker rather than a painter * Did a lot of reproduced engravings; gave way to show famous pieces in print format without having to travel to the actual place * Reproduced engravings- reproduction of pieces in print form Enable (156(:)-1609) * Most well-known Carried The Carried Academy, Bologna (Academia dogleg Incriminate) Name meaner â€Å"those who have set forth† * They were setting out to create a new form of art * Served more as an informal meeting place where artist could come to work * Wasn't really a teaching academy most people who were members were already masters at their craft * Acted more as a studio than school * Went out to the streets and drew from life (I. E.Man with Monkey) * Genre paintings- scenes from everyday life Nibble Carried Study of Reclining Boy, 1580 **The Butcher's S hop, 1580 * Monumental scene of a butcher shop * Large genre painting (there is also a smaller version) Depicts a man weighing meat, man behind a counter, man hoisting Caracas * Could possibly be a religious painting * May have been a commissioned piece for a butchers' guild * Reaction against mannerism towards a lot more naturalism in art The Baptism of Christ, 1 585 * More mannerist style * Figures are exaggerated * Figures are looking out the frame The Virgin and Child with SST. John and SST. Catherine, 1593 * A high renaissance style * Stable composition * Toned down colors * Slight distortion in figures but mostly balanced Resurrection of Christ, 1593 * Christ has risen from his tomb Large altar piece * Dramatic * Christ is floating up to heaven Agitations Carried Everyone * Doesn't give a sense of color SST. Jerome, engraving, 1602 The Last Communion of SST.Jerome, 1590 * SST Jerome on his death bead was going to take communion for the final time he made himself get up and do it * his humility is a wonderful example for the catholic followers * was dubbed the most praised painting for the entire century Ladylove Carried Madonna Delhi Scalia, 1590 * traditional subjects * SST. Jerome recognized by his lion (spent a lot of time in the Jungle once got a thorn out off lion) * SST. Jerome was one of the early church followers and translates the bible into Latin; very important to the counter reformation church * Scalia was the name of the church conversion of SST. Paul, 1587-1589 * Showing the conversion of the roman Sal, well known for being a persecutor of Christians * He was traveling and sees a vision of God and he says â€Å"Oh why do you persecute me? And is immediately converted * Paul is thrown from his horse in response to the bright shining light from God * Gets across the idea off person being shocked * Diagonal composition * In 1595 Carried splits up and Agitations and Enable go to Rome he Fairness Palace working for Fairness, a cardinal Thursday , August 30th Enable Carried in Rome Fairness Palace * Renaissance building * Was partially designed by Michelangelo * They live in * Had a large collection of Greek and roman art; one of which is the Fairness Hercules Fairness Hercules * Reconstruction of an earlier statue * Inspired one of enabler's first pieces in Rome **The Choice of Hercules 1597 * Central piece of art that was made for the Fairness Cameron (his study) first of the rooms he decorated for the fairness palace * Oil on canvas * Central canvas * The Large painting * Presents an allegory; Hercules is being asked to choose between virtue (right) and vice (left) * Vice personified as a woman of temptation; not virtuous behavior (theater, music, etc. ) * Common idea was thinking of vice as getting lost in woods and finding your way back.Portrayed here * Virtue is pointing too winged Pegasus **The Fairness ceiling frescoes, 1595-1600 * 60 by 20 Ft room * Barrel vault room * Subject matter is from classical mythology * S cenes from Ovid, The Metamorphoses; the loves of the gods portrayed through the work of Ovid * Made up into framed panels Each at the same theme with a different story in each frame * Uses paint to give a different lighting scene with each panel * Figures outside panel scenes look to be illuminated from below * Engages the viewer you have to move around the space to look at it from different angles * The central scene depicting the triumph of Bacchus (wine god) and his lover ordained processing in triumph through the center of the ceiling * Above and below are paintings by agitations his brother * Baroque classicism style

Role of women in china essays

Role of women in china essays Throughout most of history women have always aimed for a recognized place in society. Women generally have had fewer legal rights and career opportunities than men. Wifehood and motherhood were regarded as women's most significant professions. Looking at the world today, many accomplishments in women's rights have occurred since the last century. In the 20th century, women in most nations have won the right to vote and have increased their educational and job opportunities. Most importantly, women have gained the accomplishment of a reevaluation of their role in society. During the early 19th century, freedom was trying to be reached across the world. Women such as Lucretia Mott and Susan B. Anthony created many organizations for equality and independence as early as 1848. Countries from across the world like United States, Argentina, Iceland, Persia, and China met to give more rights to women; yet, even with these activist groups, victory did not occur for a long time. Historically women have always been considered as inferior creatures both intellectually and physically to men. There has always been a stereotype that "a woman's place is in the home." Women were expected to be caregivers, bear and raise children, and clean and cook for the family. Because men were seen as superior to women, they would always have the final word in what was be done. Men practically owned his wife and children as he did his material However, fortunately times have changed and so has the role that women play in society. In this country, women have the ability to choice to create their own lives, own businesses, become what they've always dreamed, speak their minds, or balance a family and a career. Throughout the years women have demonstrated that if enough effort is in place, women are able to accomplish all a man can accomplish and even more. It is important to look back upon history and value the actions taken by women in the 19th and 20th...

Common Redundancies in the English Language

Common Redundancies in the English Language One way to cut the clutter in our writing is to eliminate repetitious expressions. Because we so often see and hear redundancies (such as free gifts and foreign imports), they can be easy to overlook. Therefore, when editing our work, we should be on the lookout for needless repetition and be ready to eliminate expressions that add nothing to whats been said. Now does this mean that repetition must be avoided at all costs, or that good writers never repeat themselves? Certainly not. Careful repetition of key words and sentence structures can help establish clear connections in our writing. In effective rhetorical strategies of repetition, we consider how writers may rely on repetition to emphasize or clarify a central idea. Our concern here is with eliminating needless repetition - redundant expressions that make writing longer, not better. Following are some of the common redundancies in English. In specific contexts, some of these phrases may serve a purpose. More often, however, the phrases weigh down our writing with unnecessary words. We can eliminate the needless repetition in each case by omitting the word or phrase in parentheses. A (absolutely) essential(absolutely) necessary(actual) factsadvance (forward)(advance) planning(advance) preview(advance) reservations(advance) warningadd (an additional)add (up)(added) bonus(affirmative) yes(aid and) abet(all-time) recordalternative (choice)A.M. (in the morning)(and) etc.(anonymous) stranger(annual) anniversary(armed) gunman(artificial) prosthesisascend (up)ask (the question)assemble (together)attach (together)ATM (machine)autobiography (of his or her own life) B bald(-headed)balsa (wood)(basic) fundamentals(basic) necessitiesbest (ever)biography (of hisor herlife)blend (together)(boat) marinabouquet (of flowers)brief (in duration)(brief) moment(brief) summary(burning) embers C cacophony (of sound)cameo (appearance)cancel (out)(careful) scrutinycash (money)cease (and desist)circle (around)circulate (around)classify (into groups)(close) proximity(closed) fistcollaborate (together)combine (together)commute (back and forth)compete (with each other)(completely) annihilate(completely) destroyed(completely) eliminate(completely) engulfed(completely) filled(completely) surround(component) partsconfer (together)connect (together)connect (up)confused (state)consensus (of opinion)(constantly) maintainedcooperate (together)could (possibly)crisis (situation)curative (process)(current) incumbent(current) trend D depreciate (in value)descend (down)(desirable) benefits(different) kindsdisappear (from sight)drop (down)during (the course of)dwindle (down) E each (and every)earlier (in time)eliminate (altogether)emergency (situation)(empty) holeempty (out)(empty) spaceenclosed (herein)(end) resultenter (in)(entirely) eliminateequal (to one another)eradicate (completely)estimated at (about)evolve (over time)(exact) same(exposed) openingextradite (back) F (face) maskfall (down)(favorable) approval(fellow) classmates(fellow) colleaguefew (in number)filled (to capacity)(final) conclusion(final) end(final) outcome(final) ultimatum(first and) foremost(first) conceivedfirst (of all)fly (through the air)follow (after)(foreign) imports(former) graduate(former) veteran(free) gift(from) whence(frozen) ice(frozen) tundrafull (to capacity)(full) satisfactionfuse (together)(future) plans(future) recurrence G gather (together)(general) publicGOP (party)GRE (exam)green [or blue or whatever] (in color)grow (in size) H had done (previously)(harmful) injuries(head) honchoheat (up)HIV (virus)hoist (up)(hollow) tubehurry (up) I (illustrated) drawingincredible (to believe)indicted (on a charge)input (into)integrate (together)integrate (with each other)interdependent (on each other)introduced (a new)introduced (for the first time)(ir)regardlessISBN (number) J join (together)(joint) collaboration K kneel (down)(knowledgeable) experts L lag (behind)later (time)LCD (display)lift (up)(little) baby(live) studio audience(live) witness(local) residentslook (ahead) to the futurelook back (in retrospect) M made (out) of(major) breakthrough(major) featmanually (by hand)may (possibly)meet (together)meet (with each other)(mental) telepathymerge (together)might (possibly)minestrone (soup)mix (together)modern ______ (of today)(mutual) cooperation(mutually) interdependentmutual respect (for each other)(number-one) leader in ________ N nape (of her neck)(native) habitat(natural) instinctnever (before)(new) beginning(new) construction(new) innovation(new) invention(new) recruitnone (at all)nostalgia (for the past)(now) pending O off (of)(old) adage(old) cliche(old) custom(old) proverb(open) trenchopen (up)(oral) conversation(originally) createdoutput (out of)(outside) in the yardoutside (of)(over) exaggerateover (with)(overused) cliche P (pair of) twinspalm (of the hand)(passing) fad(past) experience(past) history(past) memories(past) recordspenetrate (into)period (of time)(personal) friend(personal) opinionpick (and choose)PIN (number)pizza (pie)plan (ahead)plan (in advance)(Please) RSVPplunge (down)(polar) opposites(positive) identificationpostpone (until later)pouring (down) rain(pre)board (as an airplane)(pre)heat(pre)record(private) industry(present) incumbentpresent (time)previously listed (above)proceed (ahead)(proposed) planprotest (against)pursue (after) R raise (up)RAM (memory)reason is (because)reason (why)recur (again)re-elect (for another term)refer (back)reflect (back)(regular) routinerepeat (again)reply (back)retreat (back)revert (back)rise (up)round (in shape) S (safe) haven(safe) sanctuarysame (exact)(sand) dunescrutinize (in detail)self-______ (yourself)separated (apart from each other)(serious) dangershare (together)(sharp) pointshiny (in appearance)shut (down)(single) unitskipped (over)slow (speed)small (size)(small) specksoft (in texture) [or (to the touch)]sole (of the foot)spell out (in detail)spliced (together)start (off) or (out)(still) persists(still) remains(sudden) impulse(sum) totalsurrounded (on all sides) T tall (in height)tall (in stature)(temper) tantrumten (in number)three a.m. (in the morning)(three-way) love triangletime (period)(tiny) bit(total) destruction(true) facts(truly) sinceretuna (fish)(twelve) noon or midnight(two equal) halves U (ultimate) goalundergraduate (student)(underground) subway(unexpected) emergency(unexpected) surprise(unintentional) mistake(universal) panacea(unnamed) anonymousUPC (code)(usual) custom V vacillate (back and forth)(veiled) ambush(very) pregnant(very) uniquevisible (to the eye) W (wall) muralwarn (in advance)weather (conditions)weather (situation)whether (or not)(white) snowwrite (down)

Education and Training Policy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2750 words

Education and Training Policy - Essay Example In the beginning of 2000, an emphasis is given for the changes in national implementation practices regarding executive and administrative structures of education, training and development systems. However, the administrations face the task of formulating policy for education and training and it needs transmission through a wide range of subsidiary competences to the institution levels. The differences in policy decisions with varying degrees of urgency and authority are subject to differing degrees of interpretation at various stages of implementation. The afore-mentioned aspect is due to complexity in the policy decisions and their implementation. However, the complexity is great when the policy is supranational policy (Phillips, David (Editor), 2003). 1 According to Adey and Philip (1994), there is a notion that the educational standards are not up to the mark in secondary school level and the afore-mentioned standards are regarding the acceptance of certificates of public examinations at secondary school level. ... The question of standards arises if there is wide acceptance for the notion of not considering the certificates of public examinations as the only criteria for standards in secondary education. The next question is about the complacency of teaching staff and ill designed material affecting the standards, as they may not stop students in getting certificates of public examinations in UK. If the later reason is true, the concern is about the methods that enhance the standards of education and the reliability and relevance of them to secondary education. The first step is to set up higher standards that can lead to higher achievement through fear of loss of job. However, the afore-mentioned aspect may lead to malpractices in education, as the impositions are not enough to enhance or bring out the ability of teaching staff. However, one should keep in view that the popularisation of educational policy may often result in crude instruments of intervention. When the interventions are crude , the methods have poor innovation in judging the standards of secondary education. The innovative intervention should have professional credibility that can lead to higher scores in national testing process. The creation and implementation of the afore-mentioned innovative interventions need investigation of the implications of our understanding about how children learn. Moreover, the understanding about the affects of curriculum on children and the way the professional development in children is affected by curriculum; ways and means of teachers and education policy decide the nature of interventions. For the afore-mentioned aspect, the emphasis on psychological foundations of innovation and a well